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1 Introduction
Unemployment has been a major problem in most parts of Europe for many
years. High labor costs are often blamed for being responsible for this situation.
Therefore, many governments are urged to reduce labor costs by restructuring
their taxes and particularly by reducing them (see for example the recommen-
dations of the European Commission's White Paper on growth, competitiveness,
employment). However, such reforms are diÆcult to apply because they reduce
the governments' revenues. To compensate for this reduction, governments must
either increase other taxes, or reduce their spending, which is a diÆcult politi-
cal task. Therefore, it is useful to examine how a restructuring of taxes that is
budget-neutral could increase employment, since a restructuring would be politi-
cally easier to apply.
We analyze two types of budget-neutral tax restructuring. First we examine
whether a switch of taxes from rms to workers could aect employment. Con-
ventional wisdom says that who pays the tax is irrelevant to employment (see
Blinder (1988)). The key element lies in the elasticities of the demand for labor
and the labor supply. This result holds in competitive markets and, depending
on the formalization, in many imperfectly competitive labor markets. However
several empirical studies show that taxes on rms and workers have dierent ef-
fects on wages and employment, contrary to the theoretical predictions (see for
example Calmfors (1990), Lockwood and Manning (1993) or Tyrvainen (1995)).
To break the equivalence result, assumptions have been made on the way that
unemployment benets are aected by the tax reform (see Goerke (1999), Picard
and Toulemonde (1999)). In this paper, we show that these assumptions are not
necessary. Non linearities in taxes also break the equivalence result.
Second, we analyze the eect of progressivity on employment. The literature
shows that progressivity is good for employment. Through higher marginal tax
rates, tax progression reduces the benets of raising wages and therefore mod-
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erates wages (see Hersoug (1984), Hoel (1990), Lockwood and Manning (1993),
Koskela and Vilmunen (1996), Pissarides (1998), Andersen and Rasmussen (1999)
or Srensen (1999)). We generalize this result.
Several problems arise with the above mentioned literature. First, the models
generally apply to particular models of wage determination (with some excep-
tions, like Pissarides (1998)). Since we do not know which model of wage deter-
mination is the most suitable in Europe, it would be better to derive conclusions
that do not depend on the model under study. Hence, there is a need of a unify-
ing framework that would exploit the common features of non competitive labor
markets models, hoping that these common features would be suÆcient to draw
general conclusions. Second in order to be tractable, many models need specic
functional forms for the labor demand, the union utility, ... Drawing conclusions
on more general functions would be desirable. Finally, tractability sometimes
restricts the model to a simple linear taxation scheme. However, as emphasized
by Lockwood and Manning (1993), actual taxation schemes are highly non linear.
The assumption of non linear taxation aects some results, particularly when the
emphasis is put on the equivalence of taxes paid by workers and rms.
In response to these problems, we develop a generic model that exploits the
common features of union-rm wage bargaining, search and eÆciency wage mod-
els. Other models fullling a fairly general condition are also included in our
analysis. None of the conclusions that we draw depend on which specic wage
determination model we choose. We also use general functions and, for the most
part of the paper, a non linear taxation scheme. Results indicate that taxing
workers is not equivalent to taxing rms only when the taxation scheme is non
linear. Moreover, increasing progressivity is good for employment in this generic
model since it reduces the incentives to increase wages.
Section 2 presents the framework of the model and analyzes in a very general
way how taxation inuences employment. Section 3 develops the generic wage
determination process that encompasses union-rm wage bargaining, search and
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eÆciency wage models. The issue of tax equivalence and progressivity are studied.
This is followed by concluding remarks.
2 The Framework
In any labor market there is a market wage w determined by the agents (rms
and/or workers). It is used as the taxation base for the computation of the net
wage (w) and the gross wage (w). For example the net wage could be a linear
function of the market wage: w = 
0
+
1
w where 
0
and 
1
are constant taxation
parameters. The tax paid by workers is T  w w =  
0
+(1 
1
)w: Therefore
(1 
1
) is the taxation rate and 
0
is a lump sum paid to the workers
1
. However,
actual tax systems are usually not linear. Non linearities will aect the analysis.
Therefore, we propose a more general tax structure in which the net and gross
wages are related to the market wage by the following functions W (w; ) and
W (w; ):
w = W (w; ) and w = W (w; );
where  = (
0
; :::; 
i
; :::; 
n 1
) and  = (
0
; :::; 
j
; :::; 
m 1
) are the vectors of
taxation parameters. Vector  transforms the market wage into the net wage
while vector  relates the market wage to the gross wage. We assume that
W (w; ) and W (w; ) are continuously dierentiable. For example w = W (w; )
could be the following polynomial w = 
0
+ 
1
w + 
2
w
2
+ 
3
w
3
+...
We assume that the labor supply increases only with the net wage: L
S
=
L
S
(w). It could also be aected by the unemployment benet, but throughout
the paper we assume that this benet is constant
2
. The rm's demand for labor is
usually decreasing in the gross wage w. However, it could also be increasing in the
1
Note that T can equivalently be written in terms of a tax rate (1  
1
) and an exemption

0
=(1  
1
): T = (1  
1
)(w   
0
=(1  
1
)).
2
See Goerke (1999) or Picard and Toulemonde (1999) for the role of unemployment benets
in similar models.
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net wage w. For example, in eÆciency wage models, the eort of workers could be
increasing in the net wage. Therefore, workers' productivity also increases with
w. Thus the demand for labor increases with the net wage. Written generally, we
have each rm's labor demand is N
D
(w;w). When there are n identical rms,
the aggregate labor demand becomes N
A
= nN
D
(w;w).
Changes in  and  modify the market wage. At this stage we adopt a general
formulation for the wage determination. It is expressed as follows:
F (w; ; ) = 0 (1)
The government's budget vary with the market wage and the taxation param-
eters  and  in the following way:
G  (w   w)nN
D
(w;w)  b(L
S
(w)  nN
D
(w;w)) G
0
= 0;
where G
0
is the value of a public good and b is the unemployment benet
3
which
is assumed to be constant. The rst term represents taxes levied on workers. The
second term is the cost of the unemployment benet and the last term is the cost
of a public good. This expression can be written as
G(w; ; ) = 0 (2)
Note that in contrast to expression (1) the taxation parameters  and  enter
the budget only through net and gross wages. Hence, (2) can be reduced to
	(w;w) = 0: (3)
We assume that F (w; ; ) and G(w; ; ) are continuously dierentiable.
To simplify the analysis, we also assume that expression (3) can be written as
w =  (w): Therefore, L = N
D
(w;w) = N
D
( (w); w)  L
D
(w). An increase in
the gross wage might have two opposite eects on the demand for labor. On the
3
Note that the remaining of the analysis holds for any b that depends on net and gross wages
only.
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one hand, it increases rms' costs and therefore decreases their demand for labor.
On the other hand, it increases the net wage (via expression (3)) and therefore
increases the workers' eort and the demand for labor. We assume that the rst
eect dominates the second, that is, we suppose that L
D0
< 0.
To sum up, the framework of the model consists of ve equations. The two
rst relate the net and gross wages to the market wage: w = W (w; ) and
w = W (w; ). The third is the demand for labor: L = L
D
(w) which is decreasing
in the gross wage. The fourth is the wage equation (1) and the fth is the
government's budget (3) which can equivalently be written as (2).
In the remainder of this section we check how the government can adjust
parameters  and  to increase the employment level while keeping the budget
constant. Any change in the gross wage modies the employment level:
dL = L
D
0
dw = L
D
0
 
W
w
dw +
X
j
W

j
d
j
!
: (4)
Parameters  directly aect the demand for labor by changing the gross wage,
given the market wage w. This eect is represented by the second term in the
brackets of the above equation. Parameters  and  aect indirectly the demand
for labor by altering the market wage w. This is represented by the rst term in
the brackets of the above equation.
We assume that there exists at least one taxation parameter 
0
(or 
0
) un-
der the government's control that has an impact on the wage and the budget:
F

0
, G

0
6= 0. The tax parameter 
0
and the market wage w can always be
endogenously set to fulll equations (1) and (2). As shown in Appendix 1, any
change in parameters 
i6=0
or 
j
can be compensated by endogenous changes in

0
and w in order to satisfy these equations. Totally dierentiating (1) and (2)
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and substituting the values of d
0
and dw in (4) gives
dL =
 
X
i6=0
A
i
d
i
+
X
j
B
j
d
j
!
with (5)
A
i
=  L
D
0
W
w
G
w
G

0
 
F
w
F

0

G

i
G

0
 
F

i
F

0

8i 6= 0 and (6)
B
j
=  L
D
0
W
w
G
w
G

0
 
F
w
F

0
" 
G

j
G

0
 
W

j
W
w
G
w
G

0
!
 
 
F

j
F

0
 
W

j
W
w
F
w
F

0
!#
8j: (7)
With these expressions, we are able to compute the full eects of a budget-neutral
reform of taxes on employment. We have the following proposition:
Proposition A budget-neutral restructuring of taxes has no impact on employ-
ment if and only if 8i 6= 0 and 8j, A
i
= B
j
= 0. If there exists a tax parameter

i 6=0
or 
j
such that A
i
6= 0 or B
j
6= 0, then it is possible to increase employment
and to keep the budget constant by an appropriate change in this parameter and
in 
0
.
Picard and Toulemonde (1999) show that the restructuring of linear taxes is
irrelevant to employment if the wage setting process and the budget are functions
of only net and gross wages. It is now easy to extend their result to non linear
taxation scheme:
Corollary 1 Suppose that the wage setting process and the budget are functions
of only net and gross wages F (w; ; ) = (w;w) and G(w; ; ) = 	(w;w).
Then the taxation scheme is irrelevant to employment (A
i6=0
= B
j
= 0).
Proof. We have F

i
= 
1
W

i
, F

j
= 
2
W

j
, F
w
= 
1
W
w
+ 
2
W
w
, G

i
=
	
1
W

i
, G

j
= 	
2
W

j
and G
w
= 	
1
W
w
+ 	
2
W
w
. Substituting in (6) and (7)
and simplifying yield the result.
On the one hand, this corollary implies that if F (w; ; ) = (w;w), there
is no gain from altering the progressivity of the tax scheme or from increasing
its complexity. Also, there is no gain from swapping taxation from the rm
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to the workers. On the other hand, if the conditions of the corollary are not
satised, employment improvements can be obtained by rising (decreasing) the
tax parameters for which A
i6=0
6= 0 or B
j
6= 0. We present here two interesting
cases.
Competitive labor markets When the labor market clears, we have
F  nL
D
(w)  L
S
(w) = 0:
Since the wage setting process and the budget depend only on the net and the
gross wages, Corollary 1 applies and yields the Dalton's (1954) result on the
irrelevance of tax incidence: in a competitive labor market, a budget-neutral re-
structuring of taxes is irrelevant to employment.
Minimum wages The irrelevance of tax incidence may also hold in case of
minimum wages. If it is the net wage (or the gross wage) that is constrained by
the minimum value ew
min
, then w = ew
min
(or, w = ew
min
). Both F and G are
functions of net and gross wages only. Therefore, according to Corollary 1, any
revenue neutral restructuring of taxes is irrelevant to employment.
At this stage we are not able to draw many conclusions about the equivalence
(or non equivalence) of taxes paid by workers and employers. Neither are we
able to predict the eect of tax progressivity on employment. To draw such
conclusions, we must slightly restrict the wage determination process.
3 Generic Model for Imperfect Labor Markets
In this section we provide a model that encompasses some of the most discussed
models of imperfect labor markets. By abuse of language, we call this model
`generic' because it will generate results for a large class of models, which include
the union bargaining, the search and the eÆciency wage models. We show that
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taxing rms might not be equivalent to taxing workers and that marginal taxes
and tax progressivity must generally be increased to improve employment.
Assume that the market wage is the result of the maximization of an objective
P (w;w; ):
max
w
P (w;w; )
where the term   is the alternative revenue of workers.   may depend on the net
wage received in other rms !, the net unemployment benet b and the proba-
bility of being employed or unemployed
4
. The probability p of being employed
depends on the labor supply and the labor demand which are themselves related
to the net and gross wages in the economy, thus p = p(!; !). In short,
  =  (!; !): (8)
Assuming an interior solution, this gives the following wage setting expression:
F (w; ; )  W
w
P
1
(w;w; ) +W
w
P
2
(w;w; ) = 0: (9)
In a symmetric equilibrium, w = ! and w = !. Thus   =  (w;w). For read-
ability, we write P
1
and P
2
as Q(w;w) and R(w;w) respectively. Equation (9)
becomes
F = W
w
Q(w;w) +W
w
R(w;w) = 0: (10)
We assume that Q(w;w) and R(w;w) take values that are dierent from zero. As
we will see, in most models, the objective P rises with the net wage because the
net wage increases the utility of workers, which is valued positively by the agents.
We also expect that the objective P decreases with the gross wage, because this
is a cost paid by rms. Therefore, we expect that Q is positive and R negative.
We assume that the second order condition F
w
< 0 is satised.
4
See Layard et al. (1991) for a similar denition of the alternative revenue in eÆciency wage
models and in union models.
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To sum up, the generic model consists of a wage determination process that
has the following three properties: it is the result of the maximization of an
objective P (w;w; ) and an outside option  (!; !) that are aected by taxation
only through net and gross wages; it is consistent with symmetric equilibrium
w = ! and w = !; nally, it is expressed as (10) with Q(w;w) > 0. The last
property will become clearer in the following paragraphs.
To sum up, we may dene the following three properties of our generic model.
Denition: The generic model consists of a wage determination process
(1) that results from the maximization of an objective P (w;w; ) where  (!; !)
is an outside option;
(2) that is consistent with symmetric equilibrium w = ! and w = !;
(3) that is expressed as (10) with Q(w;w) > 0.
The role of the third property will become clearer in the following paragraphs.
Many models in the literature of taxation under imperfect labor markets t this
generic model. So are the union bargaining, the search and the eÆciency wage
models.
Union Bargaining Model The union utility is U(L;w; ) where   is the
outside option dened in (8) and where U
1
; U
2
> 0. It is usually assumed that the
rm's prots are (L;w) yielding a labor demand L
D
(w). The wage bargaining
with the rm's right to manage is equivalent to the maximization of the Nash
product:
max
w
P , max
w
U

 
1 
where  is the union bargaining power and the fall-back levels have been set to
zero
5
. The objective P is the Nash product U

 
1 
which depends only on
5
This simplifying assumption is generally made in this kind of literature (see Booth (1995)
for example).
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(w;w; ). One also has d=dw =  W
w
L
D
. This yields the rst order condition
F  W
w
U
2
 W
w
h
(1  )L
D
U   U
1
L
D
0

i
= 0: (11)
which has the same structure as (10). In this example, Q(w;w) = U
2
 > 0.
Note that union monopoly models are encompassed in bargaining models for
 = 1.
Search Model For this example, we largely build on search models developed
by Pissarides (1990, 1998). The point of departure of these models is that it
takes time for rms and workers to nd a suitable partner. Keeping a job vacant
during that time is costly for the rm. Being unemployed and searching for a new
job represents an opportunity cost for the worker. Hence, each existing match
is associated to a rent that each employed worker i shares with her employer.
Worker i's gain from reaching an agreement with her employer is E
i
 U , where E
i
is i's return from continuous employment and U is the return to each unemployed
worker. The rm's gain from an agreement is J
i
  V , where J
i
is the rm's
return from employing worker i and V is the return from keeping the job vacant.
Typically, E
i
positively depends on the net wage received by worker i, and J
i
depends negatively on the gross wage paid by the rm. U and V can be related
to  .
6
Finally, the wage is determined as the solution of the following Nash
bargaining between the worker and the rm:
max
w
P , max
w
(E
i
(w)  U( ))

 (J
i
(w)  V ( ))
1 
:
The objective P is the Nash product (E
i
  U)

 (J
i
  V )
1 
which depends
only on (w;w; ). Maximizing P with respect to w is equivalent to maximizing
 ln (E
i
(w)  U( ))+(1 ) ln (J
i
(w)  V ( )) with respect to the same variable.
This yields
F  W
w
E
0
i
E
i
(w)  U( )
+W
w
(1  ) J
0
i
J
i
(w)  V ( )
= 0 (12)
6
See Pissarides (1990, 1998) for the exact denitions of E
i
, U , J
i
and V .
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which has the same structure as (10). Thus, Q(w;w) = E
0
i
= (E
i
(w)  U( ))
> 0.
EÆciency Wage Model Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) propose a model based
on the worker's shirking behavior in which unemployment involves a discipline
eect. The larger is the unemployment rate, the lower is the worker's probability
to nd a new job when red. Therefore, his incentive to shirk is lower and he
increases his eort. In the spirit of Pisauro (1991) or Rasmussen (1997) we use a
simplied and generalized version of the Shapiro and Stiglitz model by assuming
that the worker's eort e depends on the net wage w and some outside reference
 :
e = e(w; ):
In such models
7
, the rm's prots are F (N:e(w; ))   wN where N is the
employment level. On the one hand, the wage maximizes the eort per unit of
labor cost. Thus
max
w
P , max
w
e(w; )
w
which yields the following modied Solow condition:
F  W
w
we
1
(w; ) W
w
e(w; ) = 0: (13)
This expression has the same structure as (10). Note that, Q(w;w) = we
1
(w; ) >
0. Let e

= e

(w;w) be the optimal eort obtained in (13).
On the other hand, the employment level maximizes the prot function given
the optimal eort. So, N
D
= (1=e

)F
0 1
(w=e

) : Then, N
D
= N
D
(w;w): Under
the simplifying assumption of section 1, N
D
( (w); w) = L
D
(w) which is decreas-
ing.
7
Note that this version of the Shapiro and Stiglitz model (1984) is equivalent to the Solow
model (1979) when e
2
= 0. It is equivalent to the Akerlof and Yellen (1990) model when
e = f(w= ) where   = !:
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3.1 Improvement in Employment
We rst check whether it is possible to move some 
i
in order to increase em-
ployment (see equation (5) and (6)). In the appendix we show that in the generic
model, expressions (6) and (7) can be simplied to
A
i6=0
=  
W
w
W

i

W
w
0
W

0
 
W
w
i
W

i

; (14)
B
j
=  
W
w
W

j
(

W
ww
W
w
 
W
ww
W
w

+
"
W
w
j
W

j
 
W
w
0
W

0
#)
; (15)
where 
 = L
D
0
Q(w;w)
h
G
w
G

0
 
F
w
F

0
i
F

0
: (16)
The term 
 is the impact of the labor market model on employment whereas
the other terms in expressions (14) and (15) incorporate the impact of the taxa-
tion schedules. By the previous assumptions, we know that F

0
, W

i
, W

j
and
Q(w;w) are dierent from zero. As we will show later, G
w
=G

0
  F
w
=F

0
6= 0.
Assuming that W
w
6= 0 and W
w
6= 0 yields the following proposition.
Proposition 2 In the generic model,
(i) a budget-neutral change in the tax parameter 
i6=0
is irrelevant to employment
if
W
w
0
W

0
 
W
w
i
W

i
= 0;
(ii) a budget-neutral change in the tax parameter 
j
is irrelevant to employment
if

W
ww
W
w
 
W
ww
W
w

+
"
W
w
j
W

j
 
W
w
0
W

0
#
= 0:
Otherwise it is always possible to improve employment by restructuring taxes.
Proof. See Appendix 2.
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3.2 Equivalence and Non Equivalence
In this section, we study whether a budget-neutral shift of a tax on rms to a tax
on workers has an incidence on employment. We show that non-linear tax sched-
ules are not equivalent whereas linear taxes schedules are. The idea is to check
whether a change in some rm taxation parameters 
i
that is compensated by a
change in the corresponding worker taxation parameters 
i
fullls the conditions
of Proposition 2.
Linear Tax Schedules. First assume that
w = 
0
+ 
1
w,
w = 
0
+ 
1
w.
Does a change in 
0
modify the employment level when it is compensated by a
change in 
0
? To answer this question, it suÆces to compute the value of B
0
.
We nd that W
w
= 
1
, W
ww
= 0, W
w
= 
1
, W
ww
= 0, W

0
= 1, W
w
0
= 0,
W

0
= 1, W
w
0
= 0. Therefore, B
0
= 0: any change in 
0
that is compensated
by a change in 
0
has no impact on employment. Increasing the lump sum to
the rm in exchange of a decrease in the lump sum of the workers has no impact
on employment when the tax schedule is aÆne. The two taxes 
0
and 
0
are
equivalent for employment.
Secondly redene 
0
and 
0
as the tax coeÆcients of w and 
1
, 
1
as the
lump sum transfers:
w = 
1
+ 
0
w,
w = 
1
+ 
0
w.
Does a change in 
0
modify the employment level when it is compensated by a
change in 
0
? We nd that W
w
= 
1
, W
ww
= 0, W
w
= 
1
, W
ww
= 0, W

0
= w,
W
w
0
= 1, W

0
= w, W
w
0
= 1. Hence, B
0
= 0: any change in 
0
that is
compensated by a change in 
0
has no impact on employment. Increasing the
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marginal taxation of the rm in exchange of a decrease in the marginal taxation
of the workers has no impact on employment when the tax schedule is aÆne.
This is the result presented in Pisauro (1991) or Picard and Toulemonde (1999).
Non Linear Tax Schedules. We now do the same exercise with quadratic
functions. First
w = 
0
+ 
1
w + 
2
w
2
,
w = 
0
+ 
1
w + 
2
w
2
.
It is straightforward to show thatW
w
= 
1
+2
2
w,W
ww
= 2
2
,W
w
= 
1
+2
2
w,
W
ww
= 2
2
, W

0
= 1, W
w
0
= 0, W

0
= 1, W
w
0
= 0. Therefore, B
0
is dierent
from zero. In contrast to the aÆne example, any change in 
0
that is compensated
by a change in 
0
has an impact on employment. Increasing the lump sum to
the rm in exchange for a decrease on the lump sum of the workers changes
employment when the tax schedule is quadratic. The two tax parameters 
0
and

0
are not equivalent for employment.
Finally, let us use now
w = 
1
+ 
0
w + 
2
w
2
,
w = 
1
+ 
0
w + 
2
w
2
.
This implies W
w
= 
1
+ 2
2
w, W
ww
= 2
2
, W
w
= 
1
+ 2
2
w, W
ww
= 2
2
,
W

0
= w, W
w
0
= 1, W

0
= w, W
w
0
= 1. Hence B
0
is dierent from zero.
Again, this contrasts with the linear case. Any change in the marginal taxation
of the rm compensated by a change in the marginal taxation of workers has an
impact on employment when the tax schedule is quadratic.
From these four examples, one notices that taxes on workers are equivalent
to taxes on rms only if the tax schedules are aÆne. This can readily be checked
by inspection of the denition of B
j
(equation (15)): when 
j
corresponds to 
0
,
(that is, when they are both lump sum or both the coeÆcient of the linear term or
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the coeÆcient of the quadratic term, ...) the term W
w
j
=W

j
 W
w
0
=W

0
van-
ishes. There remains only the term W
ww
=W
w
 W
ww
=W
w
in the curly brackets.
This term vanishes when the taxation schedule is aÆne. It is generally dierent
from zero in the other cases. This yields the following Corollary:
Corollary 2 Taxes on workers are equivalent to taxes on rms only if the tax
schedules are aÆne.
Note that the tax schedule is often piecewise linear, that is, linear over inter-
vals but non linear as a whole. Extending the above argument suggests that a
transfer of taxes from rms to workers is irrelevant to employment if the mar-
ket wage remains in the same initial interval (that is, for relatively minor tax
reforms). On the other hand, for major tax reforms, the market wage will move
to another interval. The argument that a switch of taxes from rms to workers
is relevant to employment for non linear tax schedules will then apply.
3.3 Marginal Taxes and Progressivity
In this section we study how the tax parameters should move to implement
a budget-neutral tax reform that would improve employment. We then make
the link with the literature on tax progressivity and imperfect labor markets
8
(see Hersoug (1984), Hoel (1990), Lockwood and Manning (1993), Koskela and
Vilmunen (1996), Pissarides (1998) or Srensen (1999)).
Let us rst assume that only workers are taxed (W
w
= 1). This assumption
allows to isolate the impact of marginal taxes on employment from the eect of
tax incidence that has been explained in the previouss section. Let us then focus
on the class polynomial tax schedules and let us assume that lump sum transfers
8
In this model, we have assumed that the number of worked hours is exogenous. Using sim-
ulations, Srensen (1999) shows that results remain qualitatively unchanged when the number
of worked hours is endogenous.
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0
are available instruments:
w = 
0
+
n 1
X
i6=0

i
w
i
:
This implies that W

0
= 1, W

i
= w
i
, W
w
0
= 0 and W
w
i
= iw
i 1
. Thus, by
(14), improvements in employment are always possible:
dL =
n 1
X
i6=0
A
i6=0
d
i
= 

n 1
X
i6=0
iw
i 1
d
i
: (17)
This expression always has the same sign. Hence, an increase in any parameter

i 6=0
moves employment in the same direction. In order to sign 
 (see (16)),
we make the same assumption as Rasmussen (1993, 1997, 1998), Koskela and
Vilmunen (1996) or Koskela and Schob (1999) about the lump sum instrument

o
.
Dupuit-Laer Assumption All parameters 
i6=0
being constant, 
o
lies on the
increasing part of the Dupuit-Laer curve. That is an increase in 
o
reduces
the government budget G.
This assumption may be expressed as

dG
d
0


i6=0
=Cons tan t
= G

0
+G
w

dw
d
0

F=0
= G

0
 G
w
F

0
F
w
< 0:
The Dupuit-Laer assumption states that the direct eect of 
0
on the gov-
ernment spending is stronger than the (indirect) eect through the wage setting.
This is a reasonable assumption for rational governments. The denominator of

 is
h
G
w
G

0
 
F
w
F

0
i
F

0
=
G
w
G

0
F

0
  F
w
=  
F
w
G

0
h
G

0
 G
w
F

0
F
w
i
. Using the above
assumption, the fact that from the second order condition, F
w
< 0 and the result
that G

0
< 0 (
o
is a lump sum given to workers that, ceteris paribus, decreases
the government budget) implies that 
 has the same sign as (L
D
0
Q). As we
have assumed that L
D
0
< 0, any decrease in the tax parameters 
i 6=0
improves
employment and keeps the budget unchanged i Q > 0. In the generic model the
term Q is positive.
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Proposition 3 Suppose that a polynomial tax schedule is used and that the
Dupuit-Laer assumption holds. Then, any decrease in the tax parameters 
i6=0
improves employment and keeps the budget unchanged in the generic model, i.e.
in the union bargaining model, the search model or the eÆciency wage model.
If the tax scheme is linear so that w = 
0
+ 
1
w, then the Corollary implies
that 
1
must be reduced to increase employment, that is, the marginal tax rate
must increase. This corresponds to the Lockwood and Manning's (1993) results
for which increases in marginal tax to workers reduce wage pressure and enhance
employment in union models. This result holds for non linear tax schedules. Our
proposition and corollary extend that result to a broader class of models.
We now establish the link with tax progressivity. For simplicity we focus on
linear tax schedules. Tax progression can be dened as residual progression (see
Musgrave and Thin (1948), Lambert (1993) or Koskela and Vilmunen (1996)):
Prog =
w=w
dw=dw
:
or
Prog = 1 +

0

1
w
:
Therefore,
dProg =
1

1
w

d
0
d
1
 

0

1
 

0
w
dw
d
1

d
1
: (18)
For the sake of realism, it is reasonable to assume positive lump sum trans-
fers 
0
 0. Indeed, most tax schedules are progressive and provide positive
exemptions which can be equated to such transfers 
0
. From (4) and (17),
dL = 
d
1
= L
D
0
dw: (19)
Thus, dw=d
1
= 
=L
D
0
which is positive in the union bargaining model, in the
search model and in the eÆciency wage model. Also, introducing (19) in equation
18
(23) of Appendix 1, and rearranging terms yields
d
0
d
1
=  
G

1
 G
w
F

1
F
w
G

0
 G
w
F

0
F
w
:
Using the Dupuit-Laer argument for both tax parameters 
0
and 
1
, we can
check that this expression is negative. When 
0
 0, it is easy to show that
dProg=d
1
< 0. By Proposition 3, we have the following corollary:
Corollary 3 Suppose that a progressive linear tax schedule (
0
 0) is used and
that the Dupuit-Laer assumption holds for 
0
and 
1
. Then, an increase in tax
progressivity increases employment and keeps the budget unchanged in the generic
model, i.e. in the union bargaining models, the search models and the eÆciency
wage models.
4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have gathered the main features of models such as union-rm
wage bargaining, search and eÆciency wage in a generic model. This allows us
to derive general conclusions on the equivalence of taxes paid by workers and by
employers, and on the eects of tax progressivity. Results indicate that when the
taxation scheme is non linear, taxing workers is not equivalent to taxing rms.
Moreover, increasing progressivity is good for employment since it reduces the
incentives to increase wages.
Appendix 1: Proof of Proposition 1
Totally dierentiating constraints (1) and (2) yields the following system:
F
w
(w; ; )dw +
X
i
F

i
(w; ; )d
i
+
X
j
F

j
(w; ; )d
j
= 0; (20)
G
w
(w; ; )dw +
X
i
G

i
(w; ; )d
i
+
X
j
G

j
(w; ; )d
j
= 0: (21)
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We suppose that there exists at least one taxation parameter 
0
(or 
0
) under
the government's control that has an impact on the wage and the budget: F

0
,
G

0
6= 0. We solve the two equations to nd d
0
and dw. Rearranging terms in
(20) and (21) gives
d
0
= (1=F

0
)
 
 F
w
dw  
X
i6=0
F

i
d
i
 
X
j
F

j
d
j
!
; (22)
d
0
= (1=G

0
)
 
 G
w
dw  
X
i6=0
G

i
d
i
 
X
j
G

j
d
j
!
: (23)
Therefore, we have

G
w
 
G

0
F

0
F
w

dw =  
X
i6=0

G

i
 
G

0
F

0
F

i

d
i
 
X
j

G

j
 
G

0
F

0
F

j

d
j
:
(24)
For each change in the 
i
(i 6= 0) or 
j
, the market wage must change according
to (24) and 
0
must be adjusted according to (22) or (23) in order to fulll both
wage and budget equations. This yields expressions (5), (6) and (7) in the text.
Appendix 2: Proof of Proposition 2
Part (i) We have
F

i
= W

i

W
w
Q
1
+W
w
R
1

+W
w
i
Q(w;w): (25)
Moreover, G

i
= 	
1
W

i
and G

i
=G
0
= W

i
=W
0
in equation (6). Using equa-
tion (25), we can simplify (6) to:
A
i6=0
=  L
D
0
Q(w;w)
h
G
w
G

0
 
F
w
F

0
i
F

0
W
w
W

i

W
w
0
W

0
 
W
w
i
W

i

: (26)
Part (ii) We have
G

j
G

0
 
W

j
W
w
G
w
G

0
=
1
G

0
"
	
2
W

j
 
W

j
W
w
 
	
1
W
w
+	
2
W
w

#
=  
W

j
W
w
W
w
W

0
;
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and
F

0
= W

0

W
w
Q
1
+W
w
R
1

+W
w
0
Q(w;w);
F

j
= W
w
Q
2
W

j
+W
w
j
R +W
w
R
2
W

j
;
F
w
= W
ww
Q +W
ww
R +W
w
 
Q
1
W
w
+Q
2
W
w

+W
w
 
R
1
W
w
+R
2
W
w

:
After some algebraic manipulations, we get
F

j
F

0
 
W

j
W
w
F
w
F

0
=  
W

j
W
w
W
w
W

0
 
X
j
W

j
W
w
F

0
:
with
X
j
 Q(w;w)

W
ww
 
W
w
W

0
W
w
0

+R(w;w)
"
W
ww
 
W
w
W

j
W
w
j
#
:
Hence,
B
j
=  L
D
0
X
j
W

j
h
G
w
G

0
 
F
w
F

0
i
F

0
:
Since Q and R 6= 0, this last expression implies by (10)
B
j
=  
Q(w;w)
h
G
w
G

0
 
F
w
F

0
i
F

0
W
w
W

j
(

W
ww
W
w
 
W
ww
W
w

+
"
W
w
j
W

j
 
W
w
0
W

0
#)
(27)
Since F

0
, W

i
, Q(w;w),
G
w
G

0
 
F
w
F

0
and W
w
are dierent from zero, we have the
proposition.
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